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A review of Breakthroughs!
Ashoka Mody
The reviewer gives high marks to Breakthroughs!,  a book
describing  the way individuals  conceived  and developed  new
products and services, and then set about bringing them to
market.
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Remember life before Post-its?  You probably  The book presents case studies of 12 prod-
used scotch tape (made by 3M) to paste your  ucts and services; five consumer durables (cars,
note where you wanted it.  What about putting  VCRs, Walkmans, microwave ovens, Nike
the paste on the paper?  If you were working at  athletic shoes); three services (Federal Express,
3M, say, would it occur to you?  Chem Lawn, Nautilus); two health care items
(Cat Scans, Tagamet); an intermediate product
In Breakthroughs!, the authors detail the  (polyethylene); and the Post-it Note Pads.
development of Post-it Note Pads and other
products and services that have come to be re-  While the authors applaud the tenacity and
garded as indispensable (how did we ever do  vision of the individual, they give some of the
without them?)  These products now seem ordi-  credit to the firms' marketing and manufacturing
nary.  In many cases the technology was readily  expertise. Ironically, the reviewer says, there
available.  But what counts, the book says, is the  isn't much concem for economic principles.
con- cept, and even then, the route to commer-  Amana officials priced the microwave oven at
cial success requires considerable ingenuity and  $49%  because they concluded that "It's about the
corporate support.  Who were these innovators  same size as an air conditioner.  It weighs about
and what problems did they have to tackle be-  the same. It should sell for the same."
fore the market applauded their breakthrough?
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Ashoka  ModyTECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  FROM  INSIDE
This is  a  book  about  products  and  services  that  have  come  to
be regarded  as indispensable  (how  did  we ever  do  without  them?)--Post-it
note  pads,  microwave  ovens,  videocassette  recorders,  Federal  Express
(overnight  mail). These  ubiquitous  products  seem  ordinary  but the
authors  tell  a fascinating  tale  of the  ingenuity  that  produced  them.
The  technology,  in some  cases,  was  commonly  available. But  it  needed
the  imagination  of specific  individuals  to  define  the  new  product;
efficient  organizatior.  to  bring  together  diverse  elements  for  its
production;  and  both talent  and  teamwork  were  needed  to  effectively
present  the  product. Without  this  delicate  and indeterminate  series  of
events,  the  authors  contend,  the  product  or service  might  never  have
materialized!
Though  the  title  is a somewhat  dramatic  Breakthroughsl,  the
book is  not  about  fundamental  research  or the  develfpment  of seminal
technologies.  Rather,  it is  about  incremental  additions  to  knowledge,
that in  moments  of inspiration  add  up to  new  products  and  services.
The  virtue  of the  book is that  it  goes inside  the  firm,
beyond  the  research  laboratory  and  the  -ind  of the  innovator,  to  bring
to life  the  world  of  marketing  and  manufacturing.  Indeed,  its  major
achievement  is  that  it demonstrates  the  intimate  links  among  research,
manufacturing,  and  marketing.-2-
The  book  presents  case  studies  of 12  products  and  services:
four  consumer  durables  (VCRs,  Walkmans,  microwave  ovens,  Nike sports
shoes);  three  services  (Federal  Express,  Chem  Lawn,  Nautilus);  two
inputs  to the  health  care  industry  (CAT  Scans,  Tagamet);  an office  and
home stationery  product  (sticky  note  pads);  an intermediate  product
(plastics);  and,  automobiles;  described  from  the  perspective  of manufac-
turing  efficiency  rather  than  product  conception  and  development.
The  book emphasizes  the  changing  role  of individuals  and
organizations  in  bringing  a product  or service  from  initial  concept  to
market. The individual  provides  the  key  idea--the  breakthrough.  Tha
organization  implements  the  idea. A flexible  organization  can turn
whimsy  into  profit. The interaction  between  the  individual  and the
organization  is  vividly  described  in  a number  of  cases,  including  the
chapter  on Toyota,  but the  discussion  on sticky  note  pads is  particu-
larly  instructive.
The  name  3M is famous  for  efficient  R&D.  The  company
emphasizes  continuous  improvement  of existing  product  lines. Its
scientists  and  engineers,  like  many  of their  Japanese  counterparts,
spend  a lot  of time  improving  product  functionality  and  developing
superior  manufacturing  techniques.
In 1964  a team  of researchers  at 3M  began  to  explore  a group
of  polymers. This  was  an applied  research  project  without  an immediate3.
product  in  mind. Researchers  anticipated,  though,  that  the  work  would
lead  to  better  adhesives  for  commercial  tapes.
One  of the  group,  Spencer  Silver,  was  working  on a newly
discovered  group  of  monomers  that  he thought  had  potantial  for  polymer-
based  adhesives. Silver  took  advantage  of the '15  percent  rule'  that
permits  3M scieuiAsts  to spend  15  percent  of their  time  on research
problems  unrelated  to  the  company's  bottom  line.  Silver  performed  an
experiment  that  violated  the  received  methodology.  He did  not  have any
expectations  from  the  experiment. It  just  seemed  an interesting,  if
possibly  bizarre,  approach. The result  was  an adhesive  that  did  not
stick  very  well.  The  conventional  wisdom  was that  adhesives  were  not  of
much  use  if they  did  not  stick  firmly  and  forever.
The effort  that  began  in 1964  did  not  emerge  as a  product
until  the  mid-1970s. Silver  had to  work  hard to sell  his idea  to the
company. Another  colleague,  Arthur  Fry,  in  a  moment  of inspiration,  had
to  come  up  with a  product  that  used  the  adhesive. The role  of the
organization  was to refine  the  strange  adhesive,  manufacture  it,  and
convince  the  world  that  the  product  filled  a need.
It is  often  noted  that  technological  change  is incremental,
but that  these  increments  add  up to substantial  progress. What is
rarely  discussed  is  the  mechanism  for  sustaining  the  momentum  in  a
particular  direction. Is it the  case,  for  example,  that  each  increment
occurs  independently  of  what  has  occurred  in the  past?  In other  words,- 4  -
is  the  process  purely  random? Or are  there  systematic  intertemporal
links? If so,  are  they  embodied  in  particular  individuals?  Or is there
an institutional  history  that  drives  the  innovation  process?
These  are  difficult  questions. The  book  has a  bias toward
the  individual.  In describing  the  evolution  and introduction  of
athletic  shoes,  the  authors  report  on the  long-drawn-out  and  single-
minded  efforts  of Bill  Bowerman,  the  designer  of  Nike  sports  shoes:
'By  the  mid-1970s,  when  Nike  was  still  a small  shoe  company,  four
elements  had  become  basic  in athletic  shoes. Bowerman  had
introduced  them  all.  There  had  been,  in  his  mind,  a  whole--an
elegantly  composed  concept--almost  as long  as  he had  been  a coach
and  teacher. But  it  had  taken  him  more  than  twenty  years  to
gather  the  resources  and  technical  skills  to synthesize  them  into
one  shoe.'
While  this  is the  main  theme,  the  book cites  some  insLances
when institutional  memories  played  an important  role. Kenjiro
Takayanagi,  a pioneer  in the  development  of television  technology  at the
Victor  Corporation  of Japan  (JVC),  foresaw  the  market  for  videocassette
recorders  (VCRs). He 'shared  this  dream'  with  a number  of young
researchers  at  JVC in the  1950s,  and  although  he did  not  undertake  the
research  himself,  he was  a guiding  spirit  and  source  of support  when
techrnological  problems  and  external  competition  threatened  to  overwhelm
the  then-tiny  company.
A typical  problem  with  new  products  has  been the  determina-
tion  of price  and  the  potential  market. A key  step  in the  introducingthe  microwave  oven  to the  .. merican  consumer  was the  assessment  by George
Foerstner,  the  manager  and  founder  of Amana  Refrigeration: 'It's  about
the  same  size  as an air  conditioner.  It weighs  about  the  same.  It
should  sell  for  the  same. So  we'll  price  it  at $499.' Should  this  be
considered  an  example  of gcod  pricing? There  are  similar  incidents  in
other  chapters. In the  case  of the  microwave  oven,  Foerstner  had to go
one  step  further. He hired  a railroad  coach  that  for  days 'traveled
through  the  vast suburban  sprawl  that  fans  out  westward  from  Chicago.
At each  stop,  throngs  of  heavily  recruited  housewives  were  ushered  onto
the  train  and  regaled  with  cooking  demonstrations,  food  and  drink,  and
homespun  Amana,  Iowa  joie  de vivre.'
Demonstrations  of usefulness  were  even  essential  for  the
sticky  note  pads,  strange  as it  seems. Conventional  marketing  techni-
ques  concluded  that  the  sticky  pad  was a  dead-end  product. But  for  the
enthusiasm  of Geoffrey  Nicholson  and  George  Ramey,  the  product  might
have  died  a quiet  death. After  several  conventional  market  tests  had
declared  the  Post-it  pad  was  a non-starter,  Nicholson  and  Ramey  took  the
product  to the  firm's  offices  in  Richmond,  Virgi.lia,  and  literally  gave
it  away.  They  gambled  that  addiction  would  set  in  only  after  people
could  stick  and  re-stick  the  paper  on 'desks,  phones,  books,  labels,
faces.' The  day in  Richmond  provided  them  tne 'vivid  assurance'  that
the  market  studies  had failed  to  uncover.
In the  case  of  Tagamet,  a drug  for  ulcers,  pharmaceutical
firms  assumed  that  the  total  market  for  a new  ulcer  drug  was limited  to6-
converts  from  antacids. Unlike  antacids,  which  provide  protection
against  acid  secretion  by coating  the  stomach  lining,  Tagamet  controls
the  degree  to  which  acid is  secreted. '...  many at Smith,  & Kline,
French,  (the  producer  of Tagamet)  shared  an intuition  that  there  were
more  people  in the  world  coping  with  ulcers  than  antacid  sales,  hospital
admissions,  or  prescription  totals  had  revealed.' Thomas  Collins,  the
head  of Tagemet's  American  marketing  effort,  had 'a 'ision  of patients
"coming  out  of the  woodwork."' His  vision  was  critical  in  planning  the
eventual  capacity  of  the  Tagamet  manufacturing  plant.-7-
In the  chapter  on  microwaves  the  authors  discuss  a decision
to  acquire  technology  from  another  firm.  In  1949  Raytheon  patented  the
first  microwave  oven. But for  many  years  only  large  establishments,
such  as  hotels,  could  afford  microwaves.  To  bring  the  oven  into  con-
sumers'  homes,  the  oven  had to  be smaller  and less  expensive. That,  in
turn,  required  reducing  the  size  of the  magnetron. Despite  the  techni-
cal  brilliance  of the  scientists  at  Raytheon  who  had discovered  the
microwave,  miniaturization  proved  to  be an insurmountable  problem. In
1960  Raytheon  bought  an interest  in  the  New  Japan  Radio  Company  (NJRC),
a consumer  electronics  firm. There,  after  four  years  of research,
Keishi  Ogura  solved  the  problem. Raytheon  bought  only  a small  number  of
magnetrons  from  NJRC,  reverse  engineered  them,  and  then  went into
production  at its  plant  in  Waltham. There ras  no other  technological
link  between  the  two  companies: it  was as though  Raytheon  had  bought
NJRC  for  the  speci',ic  purpose  of  miniaturizing  the  magnetron. Raytheon
had  to go one  step  further  and  buy  Amana  Refrigeration,  Inc.  to  market
the  oven.  'Amana  provided  the  military  contractor  (Raytheon)  an
intimate  familiarity  with  consumer  attitudes  and  a distribution  capa-
bility  foreign  to  Raytheon. ...  culturally,  these  were two  very strange
bedfellows.'
Not  much  is  known  about  how  particular  firms  develop
particular  capabilities.  Nor is  there  much  literature  on  how comple-
mentarities  between  firms  can  be exploited. The  microwave  oven  story  is
an example  of partiallv  successful  exploitation  of complementarities.
Success  was  only  partial  because  by the  early  1980s  no American  firm  was-8-
producing  magnetrons. Even  NJRC  had  lost  ground  to other  competitors.
Major  Japanese  and  Korean  consumer  electronics  firms  had cut  magnetron
prices  to levels  that  U.S. firms  were  unable  to  match.  Thus,  microwave
oven  technology,  which  originated  in  Britain  and  was incorporated  into  a
consumer  product  in the  United  States  was  passed  to East  Asia.
A similar  tale  of technological  leads  and lags,  of competi-
tion  and  cooperation,  emerges  from  the  case  study  of polypropylene,  a
colorless  plastic  produced  at the  rate  of 14  billion  pounds  a  year and
used  in  virtually  all  those  products  that 'smooth  the  flow  of our  daily
routine.'
Polypropylene  was  discovered  by Giulio  Natta  in 1954  at the
Milan  Polytechnic  Institute.  Natta  was  hired  by Montecatini  which
merged  in  1966  with the  Italian  utility  company,  Edison,  to  become
Montedison. He shared  the  Nobal  Prize  in Chemistry  in  1963. At about
the  same  time  a  number  of  Japanese  companies  were  becoming  interested  in
the  potential  of  plastics. Many  of them  licensed  the  Montecatini
technology  and  set  to  work on  cheaper,  more  energy  efficient  methods  of
manufacturing  the  plastic. Mitsui  Petrochemical  Company,  however,
decided  to develop  the  technology  independently.  Meanwhile,  at
Montedison,  the  technology  languished  and  the  firm  was soon  in  a
position  where  it  had  to license  some  elements  of the  manufacturing
technology  from  the  very firms  to  which  ;-  had  earlier  sold  its  basic
patent. In the  early  1970s  there  was some  revival  at  Montedison's
research  laboratories  (despite  hostility  from  corporate  headquarters).Scientists  there  developed  a new  generation  of  manufacturing  processes
for  polyethylene,  a plastic  with  properties  somewhat  inferior  to that  of
polypropylene.  By one  of those  rare  coincidences,  a similar  process  was
perfected  at  Mitsui  petrochemical's  laboratories  almost  simultaneously.
After  a long  and  bitter  patent,  dispute  Montedison  ultimately  won  the
case.
In 1975  as  both  companies  were  about  to develop  a similar
process  for  polypropylene,  tw-  scientists  paved  the  way for  a spec-
tacular  collaboration.  Yasuji  Torii,  of  Mitsui  Petrochemicals,  and
Italo  Trapasso,  of Montedison,  had  known  and  admired  each  other  for  some
time. They  were familiar  with  each  other's  research. Neither  was
looking  forward  to  a long  patent  battle. Both  knew  that  the  next  effort
would  change  the  complexion  of the  industry  and  that  when it  happened,
there  would  be 'enough  to  go around.' They  agreed  to  jointly  develop
the  plastic. The authors  note  that  both  companies  have  been successful
in exploiting  the  technology,  although  in  the  case  of  Montedison  (which
is the  only  one  discussed  in  detail),  critical  decisions  in  terms  of
scale,  manufacturing  location,  and  a strategic  alliance  were  necessary.
Even  the  fiercely  competitive  market  for  videocassette
recorders  has  a history  of  complex  links  between  contenders.  The  first
of these  was formed  when  the  3/4-inch  VCR seemed  imminent. Matsushita,
Sony,  and  JVC  held  a meeting  at  a trade  show  in  Osaka:
Although  the  representatives  of all  three  companies  treated  the
meeting  as  happenstance,  it  was,  in fact,  long-awaited  and- 10  -
carefully  orchestrated.  Japanese  electronics  companies,  although
they  are  intensely  competitive,  maintain  an informal  network  of
communication  about  the  progress  of each  other's  new  product
research."
The three  agreed  to pool  their  knowledge  so that  the  3/4-
inch  VCR could  be brought  to  the  market  more  quickly. They  decided  to
pool  research  efforts  to improve  Sony's  design  for  the  magnetic  tape
cassette,  and  agreed  to cross-license  each  other's  technical  innova-
tions. "None  of the  three  companies  would  have to  pay to  use  another's
VCR-related  patents. Also  understood  as  part  of the  cross-licensing
agreement  was  a sharing  of future  innovation."  While  the  cross-licens-
ing  agreement  was  retained,  actual  research  collaboration  was  soon
stopped  as competition  once  more  become  the  major  consideration.
A  further  collaboration  was  needed  to  make the  JVC-designed
format  the  industry  standard. Shizuo  Takano  of  JVC, one  of the  guiding
spirits  behind  the  VCR,  said:  "Our  basic  policy  was to spread  the
information  as  well  as spread  the  technology  and  the  format. The  market
is large  enough  to  hold  everybody,  so se  don't  have to  worry  about
that." Takano  and  Yuma  Shiraishi  went on the  road  to  demonstrate  the
equipment  and  explain  the  technology.  They  emphasized  the  importance  of
an industry  standard  and  signed  liberal  licensing  agreements  to induce
industry  heavyweights,  such  as  Hitachi  and  Matsushita,  to  use the  JVC
format.- 11  -
The  authors  highlight  the  role  manufacturing  capability
plays  in exploiting  a firm's  technological  advantage. Godfrey
Hounsfeld,  the  inventor  of the  CAT  Scan  (for  which  he won the  Nobel
Prize)  was  also  its  first  producer  at the  research  laboratories  of EMI,
Ltd. in  England. But  EMI  needed  a large  manufacturing  facility  to
capitalize  on the  growing  world  market  for  medical  equipment. The firm
began  building  a  plant  in the  United  States. Construction,  however,
lagged,  there  was a recession,  President  Carter's  administration  pushed
for  cost  containment  in the  medical  industry,  and  EMI's  pockets  were not
deep  enough. The  baton  passed  to  others.
The  most  dramatic  manufacturing  story  is  Toyota's. An army
of scholars  has  dissected  the  Toyota  manufacturing  philosophy  and
readers  will  wonder  if this  book contains  any  new information.  What it
provides  are  fresh  insights  into  the  stellar  role  played  by individuals
in  a firm  known  more for  its  faultless  organization.  In this  case it  is
the  role  of the  integrator  who sees  the  various  parts  and  pieces  them
together.
Toyota  introdu  3d  three  concepts: just-in-time  delivery
(organizing  the  production  flow  so that  no inventory  builds  up along  the
production  line),  kanban  ("an  information  carrying  device,"  which  moves
backward  along  the  production  line  signaling  when to  move the  work
forward)  and 'quality  circles'. Even  though  the  virtues  of just-in-time
are  well  known,  it is sometimes  forgotten  that  the  concept  was developed
almost  half a century  ago in  rural  Japan  by industrial  engineers  who  had- 12 -
little,  if  any,  exposure  to  modern  methods  of factory  management  and
operations  research  techniques.  For  decades  afterwards,  Western  resear-
chers  continued  to develop  models  to  minimize  inventory,  never  quite
daring  to suggest  the  idea  of zero  inventory.  The difference  between  a
small  inventory  and  no inventory  is  profound  because  it  signals  a
completely  different  method  of production.  It implies,  moreover,  a
different  value  to  engineers  and  shop-floor  workers,  and  a different
attitude  to  hierarchy  and  worker  education. Sakichi  Toyoda,  father  of
the  Toyota  group  of enterprises,  'incorporated  his faith  in the  worker
into  the  atmosphere  of Toyoda  Automatic  Loom  Works.  ...  He established
the  Toyota  tradition  of finding  the  best  minds  in the  work force  and
keeping  them  as long  as possible  "on  the  shop  floor,"  where  they  could
examine  the  way things  are  done  and  think  of  ways to  make them  better.'
This  attitude  is almost  unique  to the  Japanese  system. In  most  develop-
ing  countries  and  even  in the  United  States,  creativity  is  not
particularly  sought  from  the  shop  floor. The  incentive  structure  offers
little  to the  bright  young  engineers  who  are interested  in  production
techniques.
Taiichi  Ohno  is  described  as  Toyota's  "interpreter."  He
pieced  together  the  concepts  that  emerged  at different  times  and  places
in the  Toyota  group  of companies. His  guiding  principle  corresponded  to
that  of  Toyota's  founder: use  human  intelligence.  At a time  when
automatic  equipment  was increasingly  common  in  automotive  assembly
operations.  Ohno  made  the  simple  observation  that  such  machines  can
automatically  and  continuously  produce  bad  products  whenever  there  is  a- 13  -
misalignment  or machine  failure. To prevent  such  loss,  he introduced
the  concept  of iikoda.  This  approach  placed  a premium  on  worker
dexterity  and  intelligence. 'He  wanted  all  workers  to learn  every
function. He gave  every  worker  the  responsibility  to  halt the  entire
production  line  whenever  the  worker  saw  a  problem,  small  or large,  that
could  become  worse  if  not  corrected  immediately.'
With the  availability  of modern  methods  of communication  and
"intelligent"  machines,  will this  obsessive  concern  with  worker  intel-
ligence  become  obsolete? Not in the  near  future. There  are  a  plethora
of intelligent  machines  available  but they  have to  be sensibly  deployed.
They  have to "talk"  to  other  machines. Unless  the  production  process  is
well  understood,  the  probability  of  mismatch  is  very  high.  It should,
therefore,  be no surprise  th&t  the  Japanese  have  had  better  success  than
others  in introducing  modern  technology  to the  shop  floor.
One  of the  current  issues  in  methodology  is the  bias in the
economics  profession  against  the  case-study  methods. Statistical
analysis  (econometrics),  in  contrast,  is scientific.  This  book demonst-
rates  (if  such  a demonstration  were  needed)  the  rigor  and  value  of case
studies. There  are  at least  three  reasons  why case  studies  may  be
superior  to statistical  analysis. First,  in  most  econometric  work there
is an  unexplained  residual. In fact,  very respectable  articles  have
"explanatory  powers"  of 10 to 20  percent. Case  studies,  by their  ve-ry
nature,  fill  in  seemingly  minute  and irrelevant  details. They  do not
have statistical  authority  but they  are  more  complete  and  can  offer- 14 -
plausible  hypotheses. The  results  of case  studies  are  also  probably
more robust,  particularly  when it is  remembered  that  the  addition  or
deletion  of a few  observations  or a change  in functional  forms  in
econometrics  often  lead  to drastically  different  conclusions.
Second,  case  studies  lend  themselves  more easily  to  a
description  and  analysis  of process  dynamics. In a descriptive  format
it  is easier  to trace  the  history  of  change. The  large  and  growing
literature  on game  theory,  with its  ubiquitous  multiple  equilibria,  and
the  industrial  organization  literature,  with its  focus  on sunk  costs,
has  emphasized  once  more the  importance  of history. The  reason  case
studies  allow  a better  description  is that  they  blend  the  quantitative
with  the  qualitative  and  they  have a  built-in  bias toward  detail.
Finally,  case  studies  highlight  the  role  of accidents.
Recent  work  by Brian  Arthur  and  Paul  David  on the  role  of small  pertur-
bations  in  nonlinear  dynamic  systems  emphasizes  that  historical
accidents  are  crucial  in determining  the  path taken  by a system. The
first  meeting  and  ensuing  friendship  between  Trapasso  and  Torii  was  just
such  an accident. If they  had  not  met  when they  did,  would  they  have
agreed  to collaborate;  would  the  international  plastics  industry  have
been the  same?
Few  such  micro  studies  have  been  done  for  firms  and  products
in developing  countries. The  authors  considered  but could  not- 15 -
ultimately  include  Reliance  Textiles  of India. While  we await  such
studies,  can  we learn  something  from  the  rich  analysis  of firm  behavior
and  growth  presented  in 'Breakthroughl"  The  products  described  in  this
book  have  been spectacular.  It is  unlikely  that  firms  in developing
countries  will  be in a  position  to create  such  products,  but the  lessons
of successful  product  innovation  are  relevant. Firms  in  developing
countries  can  create  new  products  to fill  neeas  that  are  specific  to the
markets  in  which  they  operate. They  can  adapt  existing  products  when
locally  arailable  inputs  differ  from  those  available  internationally.
In either  case,  the  process  of innovation  is similar,  though  scaled
down.  Fostering  such  a capability  is  not  necessarily  easy.  It requires
a  competitive  external  environment  and  an appropriate  product  develop-
ment  structure  within  the  firm.  It  requires,  in  particular,  an emphasis
on applied  research  (as  distinct  from  basic  research),  which  is  not  very
common  in developing  country  companies.
The  book  underlines  the  importance  of delicate  and  finely
timed  links  between  firms. It  points  to  the  importance  of bringing
complementary  capabilities  together  in the  process  of innovation.  These
links  can  take  the  form  of effective  industry  associations,  industrial
extension  centers,  informal  networks  of engineers,  formal  joint
ventures,  loosely  structured  links  between  firms,  and  so on.  The groups
may  be domestic  or  may include  foreign  firms. It  is typically  the  case
that  such  links  are  easier  to form  in expanding  markets  when rival
concerns  do not  feel  as threatened  by sharing  technology.  To  be- 16  -
included,  however,  each  participant  has to  bring  something  to  the  table.
In  other  words,  strong  quid  pro  quon  are  expected.
In addition,  manufacturing  skills  are  critical. Although
there  is  some  literature  on learning  by doing,  there  is  very little
understanding  of the  process  by which  shop-floor  productivity  is
increased.  The  Japanese  have  provided  some  insights  into  the  process  by
emphasizing  working  in  teams,  multiple  skills,  greater  independence  and
responsibility  for  production  workers,  and  closer  interaction  between
employees  and  engineers. Above  all,  they  have  placed  a great  social
value  on the  engineering  profession.  While  message  has spread  far  and
w.  ,  these  features  have  not  been easy  to implement,  particularly  where
established  attitudes  are  strongly  embedded. It should  be remembered,
though,  that  the  Japanese  took  several  decades  to improve  the  quality  of
their  manufactures,  and if  there  is a lesson  to  be learned,  persistence
is  certainly  an important  one.PPR Working  Paper  Series
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